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Decarbonization and Its Discontents: Elite Strategy in the Age of Climate Crisis
Decarbonization and Its Discontents: Elite Strategy in the Age of Climate Crisis
Detailed Information
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103537
- ISBN
- 9798288862205
- DDC
- 320
- 서명/저자
- Decarbonization and Its Discontents: Elite Strategy in the Age of Climate Crisis
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of California, Berkeley, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 185 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-01, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Bussell, Jennifer.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약When do governments act to decarbonize their economies? Political elites formulate and implement policies that shape the trajectory of global carbon emissions, but the incentives driving them are not well understood. In this dissertation, I investigate ruling elite incentives to embrace low-carbon growth in the face of political competition, hydropower shocks, and constituent resistance. Drawing upon a diverse methodological toolkit-including formal theory, a natural experiment, surveys, and elite interviews-I present three papers that challenge several popular ideas in the study of climate politics. My first paper, "Low Carbon for the Short Term," advances the thesis that short time horizons are sometimes beneficial (and long time horizons sometimes deleterious) for climate action, using more than 135 elite interviews in India and Indonesia. My second paper (co-authored with Anthony Calacino, Ishana Ratan, and Aaditee Kudrimoti), "When the River Runs Dry," finds that hydrostress- a type of climate shock and an energy shock-motivates renewable energy policy adoption but not implementation. Combining a natural experiment with a cross-national survey and hundreds of elite interviews in Colombia, Brazil, Nepal, and Laos, we argue that state capacity, elite incentives, and retrospective accountability failures likely account for this gap. My final paper, "What Do We Learn from Green Backlash," uses a formal model to show that insulating policymakers from political accountability may undermine, rather than facilitate, decarbonization. Together, these papers contribute to an emerging research program on the politics of climate change in developing democracies.
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Energy
- 일반주제명
- Environmental science
- 일반주제명
- Public policy
- 키워드
- Climate politics
- 키워드
- Energy policy
- 키워드
- Formal theory
- 키워드
- Public goods
- 기타저자
- University of California, Berkeley Political Science
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-01B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
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■1001 ▼aGuy, Johnathan James.
■24510▼aDecarbonization and Its Discontents: Elite Strategy in the Age of Climate Crisis
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of California, Berkeley▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a185 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-01, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Bussell, Jennifer.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2025.
■520 ▼aWhen do governments act to decarbonize their economies? Political elites formulate and implement policies that shape the trajectory of global carbon emissions, but the incentives driving them are not well understood. In this dissertation, I investigate ruling elite incentives to embrace low-carbon growth in the face of political competition, hydropower shocks, and constituent resistance. Drawing upon a diverse methodological toolkit-including formal theory, a natural experiment, surveys, and elite interviews-I present three papers that challenge several popular ideas in the study of climate politics. My first paper, "Low Carbon for the Short Term," advances the thesis that short time horizons are sometimes beneficial (and long time horizons sometimes deleterious) for climate action, using more than 135 elite interviews in India and Indonesia. My second paper (co-authored with Anthony Calacino, Ishana Ratan, and Aaditee Kudrimoti), "When the River Runs Dry," finds that hydrostress- a type of climate shock and an energy shock-motivates renewable energy policy adoption but not implementation. Combining a natural experiment with a cross-national survey and hundreds of elite interviews in Colombia, Brazil, Nepal, and Laos, we argue that state capacity, elite incentives, and retrospective accountability failures likely account for this gap. My final paper, "What Do We Learn from Green Backlash," uses a formal model to show that insulating policymakers from political accountability may undermine, rather than facilitate, decarbonization. Together, these papers contribute to an emerging research program on the politics of climate change in developing democracies.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0028.
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aEnergy
■650 4▼aEnvironmental science
■650 4▼aPublic policy
■653 ▼aClimate politics
■653 ▼aDistributive politics
■653 ▼aEnergy policy
■653 ▼aFormal theory
■653 ▼aPolitical economy
■653 ▼aPublic goods
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0630
■690 ▼a0768
■690 ▼a0474
■690 ▼a0791
■71020▼aUniversity of California, Berkeley▼bPolitical Science.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-01B.
■790 ▼a0028
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17357619▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
