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Essays on Historical International Conflict
Essays on Historical International Conflict
Detailed Information
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202105628
- ISBN
- 9798265428691
- DDC
- 355.02
- 서명/저자
- Essays on Historical International Conflict
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Stanford University, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 194 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-05, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Fearon, James.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation studies the causes and consequences of international conflict in historical perspective. It consists of one paper that examines the relationship between mass warfare and popular demands for redistribution, and two papers that propose and test a theory linking technological change to the frequency of war.The first chapter examines whether exposure to war fatalities created demands for redistribution and progressive taxation in post-World War I Britain. To study this question, I constructed a geocoded dataset of the home addresses of 839,626 British soldiers who died in combat during WWI. I combine this dataset with over 39 million records from 1911 UK census to estimate the WWI fatality rate of conscripted soldiers for all 509 parliamentary constituencies in England and Wales. To measure support for redistribution, I collect data on UK general election outcomes and House of Commons roll-call votes related to redistributive legislation between 1918 and 1939. I find that candidates representing economically left-wing parties received larger vote shares in constituencies with greater WWI fatality rates. In addition, legislators representing high fatality constituencies were more likely to vote in favor of progressive taxation, regardless of party affiliation. Past research on mass warfare and tax progressivity relied upon highly aggregated cross-national comparisons of tax rates between participants and non-participants in the World Wars and is thus unable to isolate the mechanism behind that shift. By using sub-national variation in exposure to the human costs of mass warfare, this paper offers the first quantitative evidence linking the creation of progressive taxation schemes in Western democracies to popular discontent over mass warfare.In the second chapter, I argue that that technological change can increase the risk of war by introducing uncertainty about the balance of power. Specifically, I claim that uncertainty about the effectiveness of new technologies can distort states' private assessments of military capabilities, creating the possibility that states in a dispute arrive at contrasting estimates of their relative military power, thus engendering bargaining failure. I develop this argument by constructing a formal model of crisis bargaining with two-sided incomplete information. The model shows that technological change is more likely to lead to war when disputing states are moderately confident about the balance of power and have relatively equal observable capabilities. In addition, I describe three mechanisms by which these contrasting private assessments may arise: inherent technical challenges in evaluating new technologies, rapid doctrinal shifts, and bureaucratic competition between military services over resources. I illustrate these mechanisms using technological developments drawn from the interwar period. Unlike most prior work, which has sought to link new technologies to war via their attributes (i.e., detectability, potential for dual use) or their effect on specific capabilities (i.e., offensive advantage), I argue that new technology need not produce a shift in military capabilities to generate conflict. It is enough that two states may come to differing conclusions about what the effect of the new technology is. In doing so, my paper presents a more parsimonious theory of the relationship between technological change and the frequency of conflict that has different implications than offense-defense theory.The final chapter empirically tests if resolving uncertainty about the effectiveness of new military technologies makes conflict less likely. Using Late Medieval Europe as a case study, I investigate whether greater awareness of the effectiveness of new bombards against existing fortifications led to a decrease in the frequency of siege warfare. To do so, I use the Fall of Constantinople as a natural experiment that conveyed information about the effectiveness of cannons to Western Europeans at different times. Due to the era's slow pace of travel, settlements located further from Constantinople obtained detailed reports of siege later than settlements located nearer. Using a difference-in-differences design and an original dataset of Western European sieges, I find that locations more exposed to information about the Ottomans' use of cannons at Constantinople experienced fewer sieges in the decade after the city's fall. In addition to empirically testing a new mechanism through which technological change can generate conflict, this paper also provides some of the first causal support for the prominent theory that uncertainty about military capabilities is a cause of war.The empirical chapters of this dissertation illustrate how historical data can be used to test general theories of international politics. More generally, these papers highlight how historical political economy approaches, presently underutilized in the field of international relations, can serve as a fruitful source of both empirical evidence and new research questions.
- 일반주제명
- War
- 일반주제명
- Fatalities
- 일반주제명
- Legislation
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 기타저자
- Stanford University.
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-05A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a355.02
■1001 ▼aTchaouchev, Denis Ahmed.
■24510▼aEssays on Historical International Conflict
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bStanford University▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a194 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-05, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Fearon, James.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2025.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation studies the causes and consequences of international conflict in historical perspective. It consists of one paper that examines the relationship between mass warfare and popular demands for redistribution, and two papers that propose and test a theory linking technological change to the frequency of war.The first chapter examines whether exposure to war fatalities created demands for redistribution and progressive taxation in post-World War I Britain. To study this question, I constructed a geocoded dataset of the home addresses of 839,626 British soldiers who died in combat during WWI. I combine this dataset with over 39 million records from 1911 UK census to estimate the WWI fatality rate of conscripted soldiers for all 509 parliamentary constituencies in England and Wales. To measure support for redistribution, I collect data on UK general election outcomes and House of Commons roll-call votes related to redistributive legislation between 1918 and 1939. I find that candidates representing economically left-wing parties received larger vote shares in constituencies with greater WWI fatality rates. In addition, legislators representing high fatality constituencies were more likely to vote in favor of progressive taxation, regardless of party affiliation. Past research on mass warfare and tax progressivity relied upon highly aggregated cross-national comparisons of tax rates between participants and non-participants in the World Wars and is thus unable to isolate the mechanism behind that shift. By using sub-national variation in exposure to the human costs of mass warfare, this paper offers the first quantitative evidence linking the creation of progressive taxation schemes in Western democracies to popular discontent over mass warfare.In the second chapter, I argue that that technological change can increase the risk of war by introducing uncertainty about the balance of power. Specifically, I claim that uncertainty about the effectiveness of new technologies can distort states' private assessments of military capabilities, creating the possibility that states in a dispute arrive at contrasting estimates of their relative military power, thus engendering bargaining failure. I develop this argument by constructing a formal model of crisis bargaining with two-sided incomplete information. The model shows that technological change is more likely to lead to war when disputing states are moderately confident about the balance of power and have relatively equal observable capabilities. In addition, I describe three mechanisms by which these contrasting private assessments may arise: inherent technical challenges in evaluating new technologies, rapid doctrinal shifts, and bureaucratic competition between military services over resources. I illustrate these mechanisms using technological developments drawn from the interwar period. Unlike most prior work, which has sought to link new technologies to war via their attributes (i.e., detectability, potential for dual use) or their effect on specific capabilities (i.e., offensive advantage), I argue that new technology need not produce a shift in military capabilities to generate conflict. It is enough that two states may come to differing conclusions about what the effect of the new technology is. In doing so, my paper presents a more parsimonious theory of the relationship between technological change and the frequency of conflict that has different implications than offense-defense theory.The final chapter empirically tests if resolving uncertainty about the effectiveness of new military technologies makes conflict less likely. Using Late Medieval Europe as a case study, I investigate whether greater awareness of the effectiveness of new bombards against existing fortifications led to a decrease in the frequency of siege warfare. To do so, I use the Fall of Constantinople as a natural experiment that conveyed information about the effectiveness of cannons to Western Europeans at different times. Due to the era's slow pace of travel, settlements located further from Constantinople obtained detailed reports of siege later than settlements located nearer. Using a difference-in-differences design and an original dataset of Western European sieges, I find that locations more exposed to information about the Ottomans' use of cannons at Constantinople experienced fewer sieges in the decade after the city's fall. In addition to empirically testing a new mechanism through which technological change can generate conflict, this paper also provides some of the first causal support for the prominent theory that uncertainty about military capabilities is a cause of war.The empirical chapters of this dissertation illustrate how historical data can be used to test general theories of international politics. More generally, these papers highlight how historical political economy approaches, presently underutilized in the field of international relations, can serve as a fruitful source of both empirical evidence and new research questions.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0212.
■650 4▼aWar
■650 4▼aFatalities
■650 4▼aLegislation
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0501
■71020▼aStanford University.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-05A.
■790 ▼a0212
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17360852▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
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