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Essays on Behavioral Economics
Essays on Behavioral Economics
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103542
- ISBN
- 9798280713727
- DDC
- 000
- 저자명
- Raux, Raphael.
- 서명/저자
- Essays on Behavioral Economics
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Harvard University, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 198 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Enke, Benjamin.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation studies economic interactions with behavioral agents using both theory and experiments across three chapters. The first two chapters study human misperceptions of GenAI capabilities and their consequences for AI usage. The first introduces the notion of Human Projection: people project human features onto AI when forming beliefs about its performance, which affects their usage decisions. A lab experiment shows that people project human task difficulty when evaluating AI, leading them to overestimate AI performance on human-easy tasks and underestimate it on human-difficult ones. A field experiment shows that among mistakes made by AI, those deemed less reasonable-from a human perspective-induced significantly larger breaches of trust in AI and further reduced user engagement. The second chapter studies the consequences of projection for equilibrium adoption of AI. Projection-prone beliefs can produce an all-or-nothing strategy: users either fully delegate tasks to AI or fully reject it, even when optimal use is task-contingent. Manipulating the framing of AI to remove anthropomorphic cues raises welfare-maximizing adoption, thereby highlighting a potential pitfall of anthropomorphism. The last chapter studies the role of audience effects on displayed moral universalism. When anticipating future interactions with their audience, experimental subjects slant their decisions toward perceived audience preferences. This strategic display is effective in raising audience cooperation and increasing subjects' payoff. Results caution against inferring intrinsic social preferences from public behavior when strategic image concerns are active.
- 키워드
- Public behavior
- 기타저자
- Harvard University Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798280713727
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32040976
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a000
■1001 ▼aRaux, Raphael.▼0(orcid)0009-0005-7425-0138
■24510▼aEssays on Behavioral Economics
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bHarvard University▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a198 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Enke, Benjamin.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2025.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation studies economic interactions with behavioral agents using both theory and experiments across three chapters. The first two chapters study human misperceptions of GenAI capabilities and their consequences for AI usage. The first introduces the notion of Human Projection: people project human features onto AI when forming beliefs about its performance, which affects their usage decisions. A lab experiment shows that people project human task difficulty when evaluating AI, leading them to overestimate AI performance on human-easy tasks and underestimate it on human-difficult ones. A field experiment shows that among mistakes made by AI, those deemed less reasonable-from a human perspective-induced significantly larger breaches of trust in AI and further reduced user engagement. The second chapter studies the consequences of projection for equilibrium adoption of AI. Projection-prone beliefs can produce an all-or-nothing strategy: users either fully delegate tasks to AI or fully reject it, even when optimal use is task-contingent. Manipulating the framing of AI to remove anthropomorphic cues raises welfare-maximizing adoption, thereby highlighting a potential pitfall of anthropomorphism. The last chapter studies the role of audience effects on displayed moral universalism. When anticipating future interactions with their audience, experimental subjects slant their decisions toward perceived audience preferences. This strategic display is effective in raising audience cooperation and increasing subjects' payoff. Results caution against inferring intrinsic social preferences from public behavior when strategic image concerns are active.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0084.
■653 ▼aHuman misperceptions
■653 ▼aEquilibrium adoption
■653 ▼aEconomic interactions
■653 ▼aPublic behavior
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0511
■71020▼aHarvard University▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-12A.
■790 ▼a0084
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17357655▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
