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Essays on the Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets
Essays on the Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103051
- ISBN
- 9798280760417
- DDC
- 338.6
- 서명/저자
- Essays on the Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Pennsylvania, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 225 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Nevo, Aviv.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation investigates the effects of consolidation and common ownership in hospital and pharmaceutical markets. In the first chapter, I develop a multi-product production function framework to assess whether hospital mergers yield efficiencies. Unlike prior studies that separately estimate impacts on cost and quality, I incorporate both into a unified model that captures how acquisitions may shift the quality-quantity frontier through gains in total factor productivity. I then conduct a retrospective merger analysis to measure the effects of acquisitions on productivity and costs. I find that mergers increase target hospital productivity by 5 percent on average and reduce inpatient marginal costs by 3 percent, with no significant effect on outpatient costs. A heterogeneity analysis suggests mechanisms underlying these gains and their potential to pass through to prices. The second chapter, joint with Atul Gupta, Alex Olssen, and Tong Liu, examines whether merger-driven cost savings pass through to hospital prices using transaction-level data on hospital outpatient care in California. We show that system ownership leads to both price increases and cost synergies for independent hospitals, but not for hospitals already under system ownership. Using a structural model of patient demand and hospital-insurer bargaining, we find that acquiring systems target hospitals with weak bargaining power. Although about half of cost savings are passed through to insurers, the small size of acquired hospitals relative to systems limits the overall price impact. The third chapter explores the welfare implications of common ownership of biotechnology startups. Venture capital firms often hold stakes in multiple competing startups, allowing them to reduce R&D duplication. Estimating a three-stage model of drug development and competition, I illustrate a welfare trade-off: common ownership lowers R&D costs but reduces competition in the product market. Under an assumption of homogeneous development costs, the model suggests that cost savings dominate in smaller markets, while competition losses prevail in larger ones.
- 키워드
- Drug development
- 기타저자
- University of Pennsylvania Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-12B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798280760417
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31931663
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a338.6
■1001 ▼aArnold, Jonathan.
■24510▼aEssays on the Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Pennsylvania▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a225 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Nevo, Aviv.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2025.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation investigates the effects of consolidation and common ownership in hospital and pharmaceutical markets. In the first chapter, I develop a multi-product production function framework to assess whether hospital mergers yield efficiencies. Unlike prior studies that separately estimate impacts on cost and quality, I incorporate both into a unified model that captures how acquisitions may shift the quality-quantity frontier through gains in total factor productivity. I then conduct a retrospective merger analysis to measure the effects of acquisitions on productivity and costs. I find that mergers increase target hospital productivity by 5 percent on average and reduce inpatient marginal costs by 3 percent, with no significant effect on outpatient costs. A heterogeneity analysis suggests mechanisms underlying these gains and their potential to pass through to prices. The second chapter, joint with Atul Gupta, Alex Olssen, and Tong Liu, examines whether merger-driven cost savings pass through to hospital prices using transaction-level data on hospital outpatient care in California. We show that system ownership leads to both price increases and cost synergies for independent hospitals, but not for hospitals already under system ownership. Using a structural model of patient demand and hospital-insurer bargaining, we find that acquiring systems target hospitals with weak bargaining power. Although about half of cost savings are passed through to insurers, the small size of acquired hospitals relative to systems limits the overall price impact. The third chapter explores the welfare implications of common ownership of biotechnology startups. Venture capital firms often hold stakes in multiple competing startups, allowing them to reduce R&D duplication. Estimating a three-stage model of drug development and competition, I illustrate a welfare trade-off: common ownership lowers R&D costs but reduces competition in the product market. Under an assumption of homogeneous development costs, the model suggests that cost savings dominate in smaller markets, while competition losses prevail in larger ones.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0175.
■653 ▼aIndustrial organization
■653 ▼aHealth care markets
■653 ▼aPharmaceutical markets
■653 ▼aDrug development
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0769
■690 ▼a0511
■690 ▼a0338
■71020▼aUniversity of Pennsylvania▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-12B.
■790 ▼a0175
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17356862▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
