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Essays on Labor Economics in the Public Sector
Essays on Labor Economics in the Public Sector
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103144
- ISBN
- 9798288861918
- DDC
- 352
- 저자명
- Foy, Morgan.
- 서명/저자
- Essays on Labor Economics in the Public Sector
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of California, Berkeley, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 228 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-01, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Walker, Reed;Xu, Guo ;Rothstein, Jesse .
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation consists of three chapters on labor economics in the public sector. The three chapters are all separate studies, but are jointly related to employment within local and state public organizations. The first chapter examines which teachers select into union membership and how a shock to union organization affects student outcomes. The second chapter asks whether civil service protections insulate government workers from political retribution. The third chapter asks whether individuals' union membership status is affected by the membership rate within their organization. In chapter 1, I examine whether teachers' unions affect student achievement in Wisconsin. First, I establish several facts about which teachers are voluntary union members. In particular, I find that union members appear negatively selected by teacher value added. Second, using the staggered decertification of district unions over time, I find increases in both student test scores and attendance rates. These effects are not driven by compositional changes within the teaching workforce; rather, I find evidence suggesting that teachers' productivity improved in decertified districts. Together, the results imply that union efforts to insulate workers may adversely affect the quality of public services. In chapter 2, I study whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to non-signers in the post-disclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution. In chapter 3, I ask whether an individual's union membership status is causally related to the perceived membership rate in their workplace. In an information provision experiment in Wisconsin, I randomize teachers into receiving an estimate of the union membership rate in their school district. I find that treated teachers substantially update their prior beliefs toward the provided estimate. Likewise, membership exhibits complementarity - treated teachers adjust their planned union participation in accordance with their revised beliefs. My estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point change in beliefs about the district membership rate leads to a 3.5 percentage point shift in planned participation.
- 키워드
- Public sector
- 키워드
- Wisconsin
- 기타저자
- University of California, Berkeley Business Administration PhD Program
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-01A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798288861918
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31995014
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a352
■1001 ▼aFoy, Morgan.
■24510▼aEssays on Labor Economics in the Public Sector
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of California, Berkeley▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a228 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-01, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Walker, Reed;Xu, Guo ;Rothstein, Jesse .
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2025.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation consists of three chapters on labor economics in the public sector. The three chapters are all separate studies, but are jointly related to employment within local and state public organizations. The first chapter examines which teachers select into union membership and how a shock to union organization affects student outcomes. The second chapter asks whether civil service protections insulate government workers from political retribution. The third chapter asks whether individuals' union membership status is affected by the membership rate within their organization. In chapter 1, I examine whether teachers' unions affect student achievement in Wisconsin. First, I establish several facts about which teachers are voluntary union members. In particular, I find that union members appear negatively selected by teacher value added. Second, using the staggered decertification of district unions over time, I find increases in both student test scores and attendance rates. These effects are not driven by compositional changes within the teaching workforce; rather, I find evidence suggesting that teachers' productivity improved in decertified districts. Together, the results imply that union efforts to insulate workers may adversely affect the quality of public services. In chapter 2, I study whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to non-signers in the post-disclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution. In chapter 3, I ask whether an individual's union membership status is causally related to the perceived membership rate in their workplace. In an information provision experiment in Wisconsin, I randomize teachers into receiving an estimate of the union membership rate in their school district. I find that treated teachers substantially update their prior beliefs toward the provided estimate. Likewise, membership exhibits complementarity - treated teachers adjust their planned union participation in accordance with their revised beliefs. My estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point change in beliefs about the district membership rate leads to a 3.5 percentage point shift in planned participation.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0028.
■653 ▼aPublic sector
■653 ▼aGovernment workers
■653 ▼aStudent achievement
■653 ▼aWisconsin
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0310
■690 ▼a0510
■690 ▼a0511
■71020▼aUniversity of California, Berkeley▼bBusiness Administration, Ph.D. Program.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-01A.
■790 ▼a0028
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17357181▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.


