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Green Moral Hazard: Estimating the Financial and Non-Financial Impacts of CEO Incentives
Green Moral Hazard: Estimating the Financial and Non-Financial Impacts of CEO Incentives
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202104737
- ISBN
- 9798290651408
- DDC
- 332.6
- 서명/저자
- Green Moral Hazard: Estimating the Financial and Non-Financial Impacts of CEO Incentives
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Stanford University, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 108 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-03, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Marinovic, Iván.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약I develop a novel structural model for analyzing the financial and non-financial implications of CEO compensation contracts that include incentives tied to non-financial performance. By applying this model to green incentives, I find that they motivate CEOs to reduce carbon emission intensity by 1.8% per year but at a financial cost of 1.3% of firm value annually. As green performance is an imperfect signal of CEOs' actions toward green outcomes, a "green moral hazard" arises: the principal should offer CEOs a premium for the risk added by green incentives. I estimate that this green moral hazard is substantial, accounting for $1.72 million of the total moral hazard cost of $2.05 million. These results suggest that green incentives pose an important economic trade-off: while green incentives can lead to meaningful environmental improvements, they impose substantial costs on the firm.
- 일반주제명
- Investments
- 일반주제명
- Carbon
- 일반주제명
- Monetary incentives
- 일반주제명
- Investors
- 일반주제명
- Asymmetry
- 일반주제명
- Parameter estimation
- 일반주제명
- Environmental science
- 키워드
- Carbon emission
- 기타저자
- Stanford University.
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-03B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798290651408
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32149665
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)Stanfordhx349xz4367
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a332.6
■1001 ▼aJung, Kyle Jaehoon.
■24510▼aGreen Moral Hazard: Estimating the Financial and Non-Financial Impacts of CEO Incentives
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bStanford University▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a108 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-03, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Marinovic, Iván.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2025.
■520 ▼aI develop a novel structural model for analyzing the financial and non-financial implications of CEO compensation contracts that include incentives tied to non-financial performance. By applying this model to green incentives, I find that they motivate CEOs to reduce carbon emission intensity by 1.8% per year but at a financial cost of 1.3% of firm value annually. As green performance is an imperfect signal of CEOs' actions toward green outcomes, a "green moral hazard" arises: the principal should offer CEOs a premium for the risk added by green incentives. I estimate that this green moral hazard is substantial, accounting for $1.72 million of the total moral hazard cost of $2.05 million. These results suggest that green incentives pose an important economic trade-off: while green incentives can lead to meaningful environmental improvements, they impose substantial costs on the firm.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0212.
■650 4▼aInvestments
■650 4▼aCarbon
■650 4▼aMonetary incentives
■650 4▼aInvestors
■650 4▼aAsymmetry
■650 4▼aParameter estimation
■650 4▼aEnvironmental science
■653 ▼aCarbon emission
■653 ▼aGreen moral hazard
■690 ▼a0768
■71020▼aStanford University.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-03B.
■790 ▼a0212
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17358686▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
