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Securing Cyber-Physical Systems by Improving and Optimizing Measurement of the Electromagnetic Backscattering Side-Channel
Securing Cyber-Physical Systems by Improving and Optimizing Measurement of the Electromagnetic Backscattering Side-Channel
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202105505
- ISBN
- 9798263326982
- DDC
- 610.28
- 서명/저자
- Securing Cyber-Physical Systems by Improving and Optimizing Measurement of the Electromagnetic Backscattering Side-Channel
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 146 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-05, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Prvulovic, Milos.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia Institute of Technology, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약The objective of this thesis is to introduce innovative side-channel analysis methods, tools, and techniques with the capabilities to characterize and defend against the growing threat of malicious hardware alterations made to integrated circuitry and cyber-physical systems.Validating the authenticity and security of an electronic device has never been more important in the modern era. A global manufacturing supply chain and the increasing prevalence of network-connected electronics in everyday life is cause for concern. Existing software-based security techniques are insufficient to protect against alterations made to hardware at the silicon level, and detection of such alterations is traditionally a timeintensive, destructive, and often fruitless effort. Through unintended sources of information leakage such as the electromagnetic, acoustic, thermal, power, and timing side-channels, researchers have demonstrated a number of non-destructive hardware characterization and validation schemes.This research attempts to further those efforts by developing tools and techniques designed to improve the collection, analysis, monitoring, and ultimately, attack detection, based on circuit activity harmonics of the Electromagnetic (EM) backscattering side-channel. Specifically, our first aim is to enable circuit activity harmonics measured with the EM backscattering side channel to be compared with circuit activity simulations, eliminating the need for golden reference measurements. The objective of our second aim is to analyze and improve upon existing near-field probe designs used to capture the EM backscattering side-channel, developing a novel probe with improved directivity and H-Field sensitivity. To evaluate the success of our second aim, our third aim is to use this novel probe to demonstrate dormant Hardware Trojan (HT) detection accuracy superior to that of previous works, and made possible via new measurement acquisition and processing methodologies that optimally reduce our measurement space. Finally, our last aim recognizes that de tection of physical or cyber attacks on electronic (cyber) devices represents only half the attack surface of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) with both cyber and physical components. The objective of our fourth aim is to demonstrate detection of cyber, physical, and cyber-physical attacks via joint side-channel monitoring of both the cyber and physical components of a CPS.
- 일반주제명
- Medical equipment
- 일반주제명
- Software
- 일반주제명
- Integrated circuits
- 일반주제명
- Power supply
- 일반주제명
- Semiconductors
- 일반주제명
- Mechanical drawing
- 일반주제명
- Computer science
- 일반주제명
- Electrical engineering
- 일반주제명
- Information technology
- 일반주제명
- Medicine
- 일반주제명
- Electromagnetics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-05B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520260202105505
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798263326982
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32308011
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)GeorgiaTech78558
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a610.28
■1001 ▼aKacmarcik, Andrew S.
■24510▼aSecuring Cyber-Physical Systems by Improving and Optimizing Measurement of the Electromagnetic Backscattering Side-Channel
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bGeorgia Institute of Technology▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a146 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-05, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Prvulovic, Milos.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia Institute of Technology, 2024.
■520 ▼aThe objective of this thesis is to introduce innovative side-channel analysis methods, tools, and techniques with the capabilities to characterize and defend against the growing threat of malicious hardware alterations made to integrated circuitry and cyber-physical systems.Validating the authenticity and security of an electronic device has never been more important in the modern era. A global manufacturing supply chain and the increasing prevalence of network-connected electronics in everyday life is cause for concern. Existing software-based security techniques are insufficient to protect against alterations made to hardware at the silicon level, and detection of such alterations is traditionally a timeintensive, destructive, and often fruitless effort. Through unintended sources of information leakage such as the electromagnetic, acoustic, thermal, power, and timing side-channels, researchers have demonstrated a number of non-destructive hardware characterization and validation schemes.This research attempts to further those efforts by developing tools and techniques designed to improve the collection, analysis, monitoring, and ultimately, attack detection, based on circuit activity harmonics of the Electromagnetic (EM) backscattering side-channel. Specifically, our first aim is to enable circuit activity harmonics measured with the EM backscattering side channel to be compared with circuit activity simulations, eliminating the need for golden reference measurements. The objective of our second aim is to analyze and improve upon existing near-field probe designs used to capture the EM backscattering side-channel, developing a novel probe with improved directivity and H-Field sensitivity. To evaluate the success of our second aim, our third aim is to use this novel probe to demonstrate dormant Hardware Trojan (HT) detection accuracy superior to that of previous works, and made possible via new measurement acquisition and processing methodologies that optimally reduce our measurement space. Finally, our last aim recognizes that de tection of physical or cyber attacks on electronic (cyber) devices represents only half the attack surface of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) with both cyber and physical components. The objective of our fourth aim is to demonstrate detection of cyber, physical, and cyber-physical attacks via joint side-channel monitoring of both the cyber and physical components of a CPS.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0078.
■650 4▼aMedical equipment
■650 4▼aSoftware
■650 4▼aIntegrated circuits
■650 4▼aPower supply
■650 4▼aSemiconductors
■650 4▼aField programmable gate arrays
■650 4▼aMechanical drawing
■650 4▼aComputer science
■650 4▼aElectrical engineering
■650 4▼aInformation technology
■650 4▼aMedicine
■650 4▼aElectromagnetics
■690 ▼a0984
■690 ▼a0544
■690 ▼a0489
■690 ▼a0564
■690 ▼a0607
■71020▼aGeorgia Institute of Technology.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-05B.
■790 ▼a0078
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17360313▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.


